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NOTE
TINY THINGS WITH A HUGE IMPACT:
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
OF NANOMATERIALS*
Dario Picecchi**
ABSTRACT
Mounting evidence demonstrates that nanotechnology and nanomaterials
impose severe environmental risks. To minimize these risks, the usage and han-
dling of certain nanomaterials could be addressed under existing treaties such as
the Rotterdam Convention, the Stockholm Convention, and the Basel Conven-
tion. However, even if existing treaties govern the handling of certain nano-
materials, no treaty effectively regulates all the specific challenges that
nanomaterials pose to the global environment. Consequently, a completely new
regulatory instrument is required. An international organization could take re-
sponsibility for developing and promoting such a nanospecific international legal
framework. By incorporating the precautionary principle, a technology transfer,
research cooperation, and a duty to promote transparency, the new legal frame-
work would provide adequate measures to protect the environment from nano-
materials and their risks.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite its origin in the 1960s, nanotechnology is a relatively young
scientific field that gained prominence in the beginning of the 21st century.1
In brief, nanotechnology is the science of ultrafine matter: the manipulation
of particles smaller than 100 nanometers (“nm”).2 To put that in perspec-
tive, the thickness of a piece of paper is 100,000 nm, and the thickness of a
single strand of hair is 80,000 nm.3 Although many scientific areas related
to nanotechnology are still at the basic research stage, there are already
multiple products on the market that contain nanomaterials or use na-
notechnology in their manufacturing process.4
Since nanotechnology is a young and growing scientific field, few regu-
lations pertaining to the control and management of nanomaterials exist.
One of the main reasons for the absence of detailed regulations is the lack of
comprehensive studies that carefully assess potential environmental risks of
1. See generally Richard P. Feynman, There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom, 1 J. OF
MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYS. 60, 60 (1992); Kristen Rodine-Hardy, Nanotechnology and
Global Environmental Politics: Transatlantic Divergence, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 89, 89 (2016).
For further details regarding the origins of this young scientific field, see CHRIS TOUMEY,
Tracing and Disputing the Story of Nanotechnology, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON REGULATING
NANOTECHNOLOGIES 46, 47 (Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2010).
2. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, SUPPLEMENT
TO THE PRESIDENT’S 2015 BUDGET 3 (2014), http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_re
source/nni_fy15_budget_supplement.pdf.
3. Cf. VICTORIA SUTTON,NANOTECHNOLOGY, LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (2011).
4. Marina E. Vance et al., Nanotechnology in the Real World: Redeveloping the Nano-
material Consumer Products Inventory, 6 BEILSTEIN J. OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 1769, 1770 (2015); see
infra Section I.A.
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nanomaterials.5 The scientific community may have underestimated the
need for a more careful risk assessment. However, there is enough scientific
evidence showing that some nanomaterials cause serious adverse effects to
the environment, including impacts on the health of humans and animals.6
Consequently, scientific institutions and international organizations around
the world are urging the international community to handle the assessment
and regulation of nanomaterials with due care.7
This Note addresses the need for international commitment to the reg-
ulation of nanomaterials. First, this Note explains what nanotechnology and
nanomaterials are. It also addresses the potential risks and harms nano-
materials may pose to the environment. Second, this Note provides an over-
view of existing treaties that could govern the usage and handling of
nanomaterials, specifically the Rotterdam Convention,8 Stockholm Conven-
tion,9 and Basel Convention.10 Additionally, this Note proposes how to reg-
ulate nanomaterials and their risks through a completely new regulatory
instrument. It identifies an international organization that could take re-
sponsibility for developing and promoting an international legal framework
to implement this regulatory instrument. Furthermore, this Note lists the
key elements that this international legal framework could incorporate and
discusses whether the framework should have a legally binding or non-bind-
ing character. Finally, the conclusion suggests the best approach for interna-
tionally regulating the potential risks of nanomaterials for the environment.
5. JOHN F. SARGENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34614, NANOTECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY: ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 1 (2011); Sci. Comm. on Emerging &
Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR), The Appropriateness of Existing Methodologies to
Assess the Potential Risks Associated with Engineered and Adventitious Products of Nanotechnolo-
gies 6, SCENIHR/002/05 (Mar. 2006), [hereinafter SCENIHR], http://ec.europa.eu/health/
archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_003b.pdf; Volker Türk & Christa
Liedtke, Invisible but Tangible?: Societal Aspects and their Consideration in the Advancement of a
New Technology, in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 67, 72
(Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2007).
6. See infra Section I.B.1 (nanomaterials can cause cancer, cell mutations or
infertility).
7. UNEP, Emerging Challenges: Nanotechnology and the Environment, in GEO YEAR
BOOK 2007: AN OVERVIEW OF OUR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 61, 61-62 (2007) [hereinafter
UNEP 2007]; see also SCENIHR, supra note 5, at 6.
8. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Haz-
ardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade art. 1, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S.
337 [hereinafter Rotterdam Convention].
9. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 1, May 22, 2001, 2256
U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
10. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal art. 1, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
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I. NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NANOMATERIALS
Before assessing how international environmental law could regulate the
risks of nanomaterials, it is essential to understand what nanotechnology
and nanomaterials are. Moreover, one should have a general understanding
of the potential impacts of nanomaterials on the environment and the health
of humans, animals, and plants. The following section first describes the
general characteristics of nanotechnology and nanomaterials and then pro-
vides an overview of their potential risks.
A. A Definition and Recent Developments
Regarding Nanomaterials
Although scientists still heavily debate the exact definition of na-
notechnology and nanomaterials,11 they generally agree on the following
definition: the terms “nanotechnology” or “nanomaterials” define a process
or material solely with respect to size, namely everything between 1 and
100 nm.12 Regarding their other characteristics, such as their shape, sub-
stance, or intended use, nanomaterials can vary greatly. Consequently, any
material can be a nanomaterial if it has the required external dimensions.
To better understand this definition, it may help to think of a com-
monly known material: silver. Normally, silver in its regular dimensions is
used for jewelry, silverware, or electronics. However, silver is also increas-
ingly used as a nanomaterial known as nanosilver or silver nano-particles,
which range from 1 nm to 100 nm.13
11. See LORNA BRAZELL, NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW: BEST PRACTICES 2, 6-20 (2012); TOBIAS JO-
HANNES SCHULZ, NANOMATERIALIEN ALS RISIKO?, HERAUSFORDERUNGEN AN DAS EUROPARECHT: EINE
UNTERSUCHUNG UNTER BESONDERER BER̈UCKSICHTIGUNG DES WELTHANDELSRECHTS 31 (2015); David
Williams, The Scientific Basis for Regulating Nanotechnologies, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES 107, 109 (Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2010).
12. Lynn L. Bergeson, Nanotechnology, Environmental Law, Policy and Business Consider-
ations, in NANOTECHNOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS 1, 3
(Lynn L. Bergeson ed., 2010); Steven Dawson, A Proposal for an International Framework
Convention to Assess the Environmental Risks of Commercially Available Nanomaterials, 15 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 129, 130 (2008); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3; Andre Nel
et al., Toxic Potential of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311 SCI. 622, 622 (2006); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Economic Growth and Breakthrough Innovations: A Case Study of Nanotechnology 2, 3
(World Intellectual Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 29, 2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_econstat_wp_29.pdf; UNEP 2007, supra note 7, at 62; Eugenia Val-
sami-Jones & Iseult Lynch, How Safe are Nanomaterials?: There is Still No Consensus on the
Toxicity of Nanomaterials, 350 SCI. 388, 388 (2015).
13. Fang Liu et al., Effects of Silver Nanoparticles on Human and Rat Embryonic Neural
Stem Cells, FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE, Apr. 2015, at 1; SCENIHR, Risk Assessment of Products
of Nanotechnologies 14 (Jan. 2009), [hereinafter SCENIHR, Risk], http://ec.europa.eu/health/
archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_023.pdf; Nanosilver: A New Name -
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Working with nanomaterials enables scientists to use materials in a way
they do not naturally exist. Materials at a nanoscale usually have so-called
nanospecific effects, which are effects the material only has at a nanoscale.
For example, materials at a nanoscale may have a much larger surface area
per volume unit, a different way of dissolving, or a higher reactivity com-
pared to the same materials at their natural size.14
These nanospecific effects can be seen in nanosilver. As soon as scien-
tists use silver at a nanoscale, the material develops nanospecific effects:
compared to normal silver, nanosilver is significantly more reactive and
toxic to bacteria.15 Because of the antibacterial effects, scientists use na-
nosilver as a compound for wound dressings and the coating of surgical
devices.16
Because of the new possibilities that nanomaterials offer, the scientific
field of nanotechnology and nanomaterials has grown tremendously in the
past decade. In fact, many scientists believe that nanotechnology and nano-
materials could have an enormous impact on the healthcare industry, social
and economic developments, and even our daily lives.17 At the same time,
the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks
(“SCENIHR”)—a scientific committee that advises the European Commis-
sion—points out that “these newly identified processes and their products
may expose humans, and the environment in general, to new health risks.”18
Nevertheless, nanomaterials are widely used, not only in scientific re-
search but also in the manufacture of consumer goods. Nanomaterials are
present in various products, such as foods and beverages, fitness and health
products, and even in goods for children. One can buy cookware, lotions,
Well-known Effects, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 31, 2011), [hereinafter EMPA], https://www.science
daily.com/releases/2011/01/110131133005.htm.
14. Priyanka Bhattacharya, Environmental Effects of Nanotechnology, AZONANO (Sept. 20,
2012), http://www.azonano.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=3096; SUTTON, supra note 3, at 130;
UNEP 2007, supra note 7, at 62; Valsami-Jones & Lynch, supra note 12, at 388.
15. EMPA, supra note 13, at 2; Anita K. Patlolla et al., Genotoxicity Study of Silver
Nanoparticles in Bone Marrow Cells of Sprague-Dawley Rats, 85 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY
52, 52 (2015); UNEP, Frontiers 2017: Emerging Issues of Environmental Concern 27 (2017),
[hereinafter UNEP 2017], https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22255/
Frontiers_2017_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
16. Karla Chaloupka et al., Nanosilver as a New Generation of Nanoproduct in Biomedical
Applications, 28 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 580, 585 (2010); Liu et al., supra note 13, at 2.
17. SALLY DALTON-BROWN, NANOTECHNOLOGY AND ETHICAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND CHINA: TOWARDS A GLOBAL APPROACH FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 12 (2015); David
A. Dana, The Nanotechnology Challenge, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE, CREATING LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 3, 3 (David A. Dana ed., 2012); cf. ERIC GAFFET, Nanomateri-
als and Nanoproducts: World Markets and Human and Environmental Impacts, in NANOETHICS AND
NANOTOXICOLOGY XXXIII, XXXIV (Philippe Houdy et al. eds., 2011).
18. SCENIHR, supra note 5, at 8.
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makeup, deodorants, air filters, and baby bottles, all of which contain nano-
materials.19 Manufacturers expect various benefits by adding nanomaterials
to their consumer products. For instance, certain nanomaterials in cosmetics
can help ingredients to more easily penetrate the skin and to more effec-
tively protect the skin from UV light.20 Another example is the use of nano-
materials in food packaging, which can help to reduce bacterial
contamination of food.21
Since it is generally not required to officially label products that contain
nanomaterials, scientific organizations have started databases of such prod-
ucts. One of those databases is the Consumer Products Inventory of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnology, which was launched in 2005 and has steadily
evolved since.22
As a matter of fact, the number of nanomaterial-containing products
that consumers can readily purchase has increased by leaps and bounds.
Between 2005 and 2014, the number of registered products on the Con-
sumer Products Inventory rose from 54 to 1,814.23 Since 2010, the number
of products containing nanomaterials has risen by more than 75 percent.24
These figures are likely higher today because databases on consumer goods
containing nanomaterials are not comprehensive.25
Additionally, private and public funding for research and development
demonstrates the increasing importance and rapid growth of the field of
nanotechnology and nanomaterials. Between 2000 and 2010, global govern-
ment funding rose from USD 1.2 billion to USD 18 billion.26 In 2012 alone,
19. All Products, CONSUMER PRODS. INVENTORY, [hereinafter CPI Database], http://www
.nanotechproject.org/cpi/products/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
20. Silpa Raj et al., Nanotechnology in Cosmetics, 4 J. PHARMACY & BIOALLIED SCI. 186,
186 (2012).
21. Alina Martirosyan & Yves-Jacques Schneider, Engineered Nanomaterials in Food: Im-
plications for Food Safety and Consumer Health, 11 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 5720, 5728
(2014).
22. Todd Kuiken et al., Public’s Understanding, Perceptions, and Acceptance of Na-
notechnology through the Lens of Consumer Products, in NANOENGINEERING: GLOBAL APPROACHES TO
HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 151, 151-52 (Patricia E. Dolez ed., 2015); Vance et al., supra note 4,
at 1770; CPI DATABASE, supra note 19.
23. Vance et al., supra note 4, at 1771.
24. Id.; cf. BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 15.
25. Kuiken et al., supra note 22, at 154; Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 100.
26. CIENTIFICA, THE GLOBAL FUNDING OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND ITS IMPACT 4 (2011), http:/
/cientifica.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Global-Nanotechnology-Funding-
Report-2011.pdf; Sabil Francis, Public Funding of Nanoscale Science and Engineering, in 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF NANOSCIENCE & SOC’Y 637, 637 (David H. Guston ed., 2010).
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the U.S. and the EU each spent approximately USD 2.1 billion for research
and development regarding nanotechnology and nanomaterials.27
In conclusion, nanomaterials are microscopically small materials that
could have far-reaching impacts on our daily lives. Without a doubt, some
of these impacts will be positive, such as the tremendous advances in the
health industry that nanomaterials have brought.28  For example, certain
nanomaterials can help to deliver drugs directly into tumor cells, which
provides a more efficient way of treating cancer.29 However, despite the
potential advantages and the growing interest in nanomaterials, they also
impose new risks to our environment. Thus, society must pay due attention
not only to the advantages of nanomaterials but also to their disadvantages.
B. Possible Risks of Nanomaterials for the Environment
Although there has been a boom in the research and development of
nanomaterials, the scientific data on the potential risks and harm of nano-
materials is anything but comprehensive.30 Since nanotechnology is such a
versatile and complex technology, and due to the young age of this scientific
field, detailed and extensive scientific data is still lacking, particularly long-
term studies.31 In spite of this lack of comprehensive scientific data, various
studies have shown strong evidence that nanomaterials bear certain environ-
mental risks.32 Besides addressing the potential risks and dangers of nano-
materials, this section discusses whether these risks rise to a level of global
concern for the environment.
1. Is There Anything the Environment has to Fear?
A closer look at the studies examining the potential harm caused by
nanomaterials reveals four primary areas of concern: (1) the general toxicity
of nanomaterials, (2) the accumulation of nanomaterials within biological
27. Bergeson, supra note 12, at 1; LarrimoreOuellette, supra note 12, at 17; cf. NAT’L SCI.
& TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 9.
28. Cf. supra Section I.A (discussing nanomaterials’ huge economic potential).
29. See UNEP 2017, supra note 15, at 26; Guifa Xi et al., Convection-Enhanced Delivery
of Nanodiamond Drug Delivery Platforms for Intracranial Tumor Treatment, 10 NANOMEDICINE:
NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY & MED. 381, 389 (2014).
30. See supra Introduction.
31. See Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Regulating Nanotechnologies, Risk, Uncertainty and
the Global Governance Gap, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 30, 31 (2012); Sebastian Heselhaus, Nano-
materials and the Precautionary Principle in the EU, 33 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 91, 93-94 (2010);
Türk & Liedtke, supra note 5, at 71-72.
32. See infra Section I.B.1.
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systems, (3) the non-biodegradability of nanomaterials, and (4) the trans-
boundary harm33 caused by nanomaterials.
First, various studies evidence that certain nanomaterials are toxic and
are causing severe harm to humans, animals, and plants; for instance, nano-
materials can cause cancer, infertility, inflammation, allergic reactions, or
autoimmune responses.34 Some nanomaterials even possess effects similar
to those of asbestos, which means that they could lead to inflammatory
reactions and lung cancer.35 In particular, there have been serious concerns
related to carbon nanotubes—a new form of carbon molecules with a tubu-
lar structure—that have a similar fiber-like shape as asbestos and therefore
similar respiratory toxicity.36 Furthermore, studies show that, in certain
species, exposure to nanomaterials can reduce the growth of plants, plant
yield, and even the quality of plant seeds.37 Additionally, various nano-
materials can dramatically change the cell structure of living organisms,
which leads to unpredictable future damages.38 The negative effects of na-
nomaterials on cell structure can affect the DNA of a cell, possibly resulting
33. In accordance with Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, the term “transboundary
harm” refers to “damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction” (emphasis added). U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
34. See Haji Bahadar et al., Toxicity of Nanoparticles and an Overview of Current Experi-
mental Models, 20 IRANIAN BIOMEDICAL J. 1, 2-4 (2016); Nel et al., supra note 12, at 622, 626-27;
SCENIHR, Risk, supra note 13, at 8, 26-27.
35. See Rosana Simón-Vázquez et al., Nanotoxicology, in NANOBIOTECHNOLOGY: INORGANIC
NANOPARTICLES VS ORGANIC NANOPARTICLES 441, 444 (Jesús M. De la Fuente & Valeria Grazú
eds., 2012); Atsuya Takagi et al., Induction of Mesothelioma in p53+/- Mouse by Intraperitoneal
Application of Multi-Wall Carbon Nanotube, 33 J. TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 105, 114 (2008); UNEP
2017, supra note 15, at 29.
36. Robert J. AITKEN et al., Regulation of Carbon Nanotubes and Other High Aspect Ratio
Nanoparticles, Approaching this Challenge from the Perspective of Asbestos, in INTERNATIONAL HAND-
BOOK ON REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES 205, 205-06 (Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2010). The
similarities between nanomaterials and asbestos are especially alarming because, in the begin-
ning, regulators did not take asbestos’ risks seriously enough. Although there were many
suspicions regarding the health risks of asbestos, it took decades for legislators to introduce
effective regulations for asbestos. See BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 18. Legislators are similarly
overlooking the potential health risks of nanomaterials and are not establishing detailed na-
nospecific regulations.
37. Farzad Aslani et al., Effects of Engineered Nanomaterials on Plants Growth: An Over-
view, SCI. WORLD J., Aug. 2014, at 14, 16, http://www.hindawi.com/journals/tswj/2014/
641759/; Mélanie Auffan et al., Ecotoxicology, Nanoparticle Reactivity and Living Organisms, in
NANOETHICS AND NANOTOXICOLOGY 325, 349-50 (Philippe Houdy et al. eds., 2011).
38. See Bahadar et al., supra note 34, at 1, 5; Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 31, at 10;
Valsami-Jones & Lynch, supra note 12, at 388.
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in DNA alterations and genetic or chromosomal mutations.39 Such muta-
tions can lead to malformations, cancer, and an increase in cellular death,
causing severe tissue damage.40
Second, there is a significant risk that nanomaterials can accumulate in
organisms and ecosystems.41 The risks of bioaccumulation of nanomaterials
is particularly worrisome because of their size.42 Since nanomaterials are
even smaller than bacteria, they could accumulate in the smallest links of
the food chain.43 Moreover, nanomaterials can cross barriers in an organism
that were formerly regarded as impenetrable.44 For instance, studies with
rats and in vitro studies have shown that nanomaterials can pass through the
blood-brain barrier and thereby enter brain cells.45 The ability of nano-
materials to pass through the blood-brain barrier is significant because the
brain is one of the best-protected human organs.46 The brain is shielded
from potentially dangerous or harmful compounds by the blood-brain bar-
rier. This barrier—a membrane between the neural tissue and the blood-
stream—limits the transfer of compounds from the blood to the brain.47
However, this protective barrier fails to shield the brain from certain nano-
39. Alain Botta & Läıla Benameur, Nanoparticle Toxicity Mechanisms: Genotoxicity, in
NANOETHICS AND NANOTOXICOLOGY 111, 118 (Philippe Houdy et al. eds., 2011).
40. Junchao Duan et al., Toxic Effects of Silica Nanoparticles on Zebrafish Embryos and
Larvae, PLOS ONE, at 7 (Sept. 2013); cf. Nan Mei et al., Silver Nanoparticle-Induced Muta-
tions and Oxidative Stress in Mouse Lymphoma Cells, 53 ENVTL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 409,
417 (2012); Patlolla, supra note 15, at 58.
41. See SCENIHR, Risk, supra note 13, at 21; Min-Kyeong Yeo & Dong-Ha Nam,
Influence of Different Types of NanoMaterials on their Bioaccumulation in a Paddy Microcosm: A
Comparison of TiO2 Nanoparticles and Nanotubes, 178 ENVTL. POLLUTION 166, 166 (2013).
42. Dong-Ha Nam et al., Uptake and Bioaccumulation of Titanium and Silver-Nanopar-
ticles in Aquatic Ecosystems, 10 MOLECULAR & CELLULAR TOXICOLOGY 9, 11 (2014).
43. See SCENIHR, supra note 5, at 40-42; Yeo & Nam, supra note 41, at 167; cf. Carlos
Medina et al., Nanoparticles, Pharmacological and Toxicological Significance, 150 BRIT. J. PHARMA-
COLOGY 552, 554 (2007).
44. Heselhaus, supra note 31, at 94, 104; see Željka Krpetić et al., Nanomaterials, Impact
on Cells and Cell Organelles, in NANOMATERIAL, IMPACTS ON CELL BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 135, 137
(David G. Capco & Yongshen Chen eds., 2014); see Medina et al., supra note 43, at 554; see
also Nel et al., supra note 12, at 625.
45. Cláudia Saraiva et al., Nanoparticle-Mediated Brain Drug Delivery: Overcoming Blood-
Brain Barrier to Treat Neurodegenerative Diseases, 235 J. CONTROLLED RELEASE 34, 36-37 (2016);
see Myrtill Simkó & Mats-Olof Mattsson, Interactions Between Nanosized Materials and the
Brain, 21 CURRENT MED. CHEMISTRY 4200, 4203-04 (2014); cf. Auffan et al., supra note 37, at
347.
46. Simkó & Mattsson, supra note 45, at 4202; see Svetlana M. Stamatović et al., Brain
Endothelial Cell-Cell Junctions: How to “Open” the Blood Brain Barrier, 6 CURRENT
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 179, 179 (2008); cf. SCHULZ, supra note 11, at 263.
47. See Saraiva et al., supra note 45, at 35; Simkó & Mattsson, supra note 45, at 4202;
Stamatović et al., supra note 46, at 179.
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materials. As a result, nanomaterials could accumulate in novel places with
unpredictable consequences.48
Third, the concern that nanomaterials could accumulate in biological
systems goes together with the fact that many nanomaterials are non-bi-
odegradable.49 Non-biodegradable materials do not break down naturally
and hence, are not dissolved into the earth. Consequently, non-biodegrad-
able materials persist in the environment, and their toxicity can have a long-
term, negative impact on living beings.50 Since many nanomaterials are in-
organic and non-biodegradable, they not only pose imminent risks to the
environment but also impose long-lasting environmental consequences,
which are currently not assessable.51
Fourth, due to the size of nanomaterials and their ability to accumulate
in the smallest organisms, there is a risk that they are likely to travel long
distances. Once nanomaterials are free in the environment, it is possible
that water, winds, animals, and even bacteria could transport them across
borders and countries.52 As a result, it is likely that nanomaterials are tran-
scending mere local dimensions and are imposing transboundary harm to
the environment.
2. Should the Risks of Nanomaterials be
a Global Concern?
Most nations currently lack specific legislation on nanomaterials. For
example, China—the nation with the second highest spending on na-
notechnology research after the U.S.—has not enacted any substantial na-
nospecific regulations.53 Other countries, like the U.S., treat nanomaterials
mainly like other substances and regulate them using existing statutes.54 If
48. Importantly, crossing the blood-brain barrier carries both potential risks and great
opportunities for human health. Nanotechnology enables scientists to overcome the blood-
brain barrier for therapeutic purposes. Therefore, it could be possible to treat neurological
diseases with nanosized substances that can cross the blood-brain barrier. See Saraiva et al.,
supra note 45, at 43-44; Simkó & Mattsson, supra note 45, at 4202.
49. See Simón-Vázquez et al., supra note 35, at 444; UNEP 2007, supra note 7, at 67-68.
50. Nel et al., supra note 12, at 624; Türk & Liedtke, supra note 5, at 72.
51. SCENIHR, supra note 5, at 37-38.
52. Heselhaus, supra note 31, at 94; see Valsami-Jones & Lynch, supra note 12, at 388
(noting that once nanomaterials are released into the human body or the environment, they
are impossible to find again).
53. BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 222; DALTON-BROWN, supra note 17, at 3-4; Darryl S. L.
Jarvis & Noah Richmond, Regulation and Governance of Nanotechnology in China: Regulatory
Challenges and Effectiveness, 2 EUR. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2011), http://www.ejlt.org/article/view/
94.
54. Gary E. Marchant et al., Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach, in
NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 189, 208 (Graeme A.
Hodge et al. eds., 2007).
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at all, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) impose specific regulations on certain nano-
materials in accordance with their existing regulatory power.55 For instance,
the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”)56 provides different regulatory
measures the EPA can take. Under Section 4 of the TSCA, the EPA can
regulate any chemical substance if it finds that the chemical imposes an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.57 Moreover, Sec-
tion 5 of the TSCA gives the EPA the power to screen and track new chem-
ical products before they are available on the market.58 If necessary, the
EPA can implement regulatory measures to control unreasonable risk im-
posed by new chemical products.59
Generally, the U.S. has a more market-oriented approach toward the
regulation of nanomaterials.60 In comparison, the European Union (“EU”)
pursues a more precautionary approach toward nanomaterials, which en-
ables the regulation of certain substances even without comprehensive and
conclusive scientific data concerning their potential risks.61 Because of this
precautionary approach, the EU has introduced some nanospecific
regulations.62
55. In 2008, the EPA decided that carbon nanotubes fall within the definition of new
chemical products and therefore will be regulated more strictly under Section 5 of the
TSCA. For further details, see Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 97-98.
56. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469 (1976) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-97 (2012)).
57. Id. § 2605(a).
58. Id. § 2604(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(3).
59. Id. § 2604(f). Since the EPA’s decision that carbon nanotubes fall within the cate-
gory of new chemical products, they can be regulated more strictly under Section 5 of the
TSCA. Cf. Julie A. Miller, US EPA Finalizes SNUR on Carbon Nanotubes, CHEMICALWATCH
(Oct. 4, 2014), http://chemicalwatch.com/59704/us-epa-finalises-snur-on-carbon-nanotubes.
For further details on how the TSCA could regulate nanomaterials and their risks, see Albert
C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 362 (2007);
Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 97-98.
60. Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 96; cf. BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 193; Lin, supra note
59, at 361.
61. Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 31, at 7; Mireille Oud, A European Perspective, in NEW
GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 265, 267 (Graeme A. Hodge et
al. eds., 2007); Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 94; Heselhaus, supra note 31, at 104.
62. For example, the EU has introduced nanospecific provisions for biocidal products
(inter alia Regulation 528/2012, art. 19(1)(f) or art. 58(3)(d) 2012 O.J. (L. 167) (EU)) and for
cosmetics (Regulation 1223/2009, art. 16 2009 O.J. (L 342) (EC)). Besides these regulations,
the EU has also introduced nanospecific provisions in its Novel Food Regulations, which
require a special authorization process for food containing nanomaterials (inter alia Regula-
tion 2015/2283, art. 10(4) 2015 O.J. (L. 327) (EU)). Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 94; cf.
BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 168; SCHULZ, supra note 11, at 106.
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However, because of the sparse national legislation, there is a signifi-
cant divergence between regions and countries in terms of how they regu-
late nanomaterials. This divergence could lead to a dangerous race to the
bottom, wherein certain countries may try to gain a competitive advantage
in nanotechnology by limiting regulatory restrictions to the bare
minimum.63
Overall, nanomaterials impose countless potential risks and dangers,
not only to humans but also to animals, plants, and even the smallest orga-
nisms at the end of the food chain.64 Since scientific studies lead to the
conclusion that nanomaterials will persist in the environment for decades
and will travel across borders without issue, nanomaterials have the capacity
to harm the entire global environment for a lengthy period of time.
Based on these facts, single nations alone cannot comprehensively regu-
late the risks and dangers of nanomaterials. Nanomaterials lead to global as
well as interconnected threats, requiring response from the international
community. Because of the global character of the risks of nanomaterials,
less strict regulations in one state or region will ultimately affect the entire
environment.65 Therefore, the international community should avoid a reg-
ulatory divide between regions. Furthermore, the international community
should also avoid making the same mistakes it made with other threats to
the environment, such as asbestos or heavy metals, for which collective ac-
tions should have been initiated much earlier.66
In summary, nanomaterials impose potential intertwined and transna-
tional risks to the environment, which national legislation alone cannot ade-
quately regulate.67 These characteristics render nanomaterials a global risk
to the environment. Consequently, an effective risk management strategy
requires common action and international cooperation, which “respect[s] the
interests of all and protect[s] the integrity of the global environmental . . .
system” as stated in the Preamble of the Rio Declaration.68
63. Cf. Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. Sylvester, Transnational Models for Regulation of
Nanotechnology, 34 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 714, 717 (2006); SARGENT, supra note 5, at 28; SUTTON,
supra note 3, at 234.
64. See supra Section I.B.1.
65. Cf. Marchant & Sylvester, supra note 63, at 716-17; SUTTON, supra note 3, at 234-35;
Türk & Liedtke, supra note 5, at 71-72.
66. See Simón-Vázquez et al., supra note 35, at 444; cf. Arthur Lyon Dahl, Environment
and Globalization, in UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 95 (Samir Dasgupta ed., 2009).
67. See supra Section I.B; supra Section I.B.2.
68. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, preamble (emphasis added).
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II. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES THAT COULD POTENTIALLY REGULATE
NANOMATERIALS AND THEIR RISKS
Because nanomaterials will impact the global environment, a strategy
must be formulated to regulate nanomaterials at the international level. The
following section looks at international treaties regulating toxic chemicals,
specifically the Rotterdam Convention, the Stockholm Convention, and the
Basel Convention. For each of these treaties, this Note examines whether
nanomaterials fall within the treaty’s current regulatory mechanisms.
A. Rotterdam Convention
The Rotterdam Convention or PIC69 Convention, adopted in 1998,
deals with international trade of certain hazardous chemicals.70 The key
component of the Convention is the prior informed consent procedure for
certain chemicals and pesticides.71 The Rotterdam Convention does not
prohibit the trade of chemicals but creates a procedure designed to ensure
that a member state must give prior informed consent (“PIC”) before an
exporting state can export certain chemicals to it.72 According to Article 3
of the Rotterdam Convention, the Convention applies “to (a) banned or se-
verely restricted chemicals; and (b) severely hazardous pesticide
formulations.”73
To be considered a banned or severely restricted chemical, a substance
must be listed in Annex III of the Convention.74 Under Article 5(5) of the
Rotterdam Convention, adding chemicals to this list requires that nations in
at least two regions propose the listing of a new chemical.75 Subsequently,
in accordance with Article 5(6) of the Rotterdam Convention, an expert
Chemical Review Committee makes a recommendation to the Conference
of the Parties whether or not to amend the list to include the new chemi-
cal.76 Finally, as stated in Article 22(5)(b), the decision to list a chemical is
69. PIC stands for “prior informed consent,” an important instrument of the Rotter-
dam Convention.
70. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.
71. ULRICH BEYERLIN & THILO MARAUHN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 220 (2011);
PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 446 (3rd ed., 2009); MARY
ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 573 (7th ed.
2015); cf. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, arts. 10, 11.
72. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 446-47; EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 709-10 (2d ed. 2007); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY 926 (5th ed. 2015).
73. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, art. 3 (emphasis added).
74. Id. art. 6(1).
75. Id. art. 5(5).
76. Id. art. 5(6).
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based solely on the consensus of all the parties to the Rotterdam Conven-
tion, which means that any party can veto the listing of a new substance.77
Applying these rules to nanomaterials, they would only fall within the
scope of the Rotterdam Convention if they were listed in Annex III. How-
ever, there are two main obstacles for listing nanomaterials in Annex III of
the Convention: first, nanomaterials are only defined by their size, which
means that any chemical between 1 and 100 nm can be a nanomaterial.78
Consequently, the parties would have to list countless chemical substances
because they cannot simply refer to the size of substances in general. Sec-
ond, comprehensive and in-depth scientific results regarding the risks of
nanomaterials to health and the environment are still non-existent. The lack
of comprehensive scientific documentation regarding the hazardous charac-
teristics of nanomaterials provides an easy and convenient ground for veto-
ing its listing as a new substance in Annex III of the Convention.79
Even if certain nanomaterials were listed in Annex III, the Rotterdam
Convention would only regulate the import and export of nanomaterials,
not their risks and possible harm in general. However, regarding the new
and specific threats nanomaterials pose to the global environment, it is es-
sential to regulate these risks comprehensively rather than merely regulating
the import or export of nanomaterials. In particular, more cautious and
transparent use of nanomaterials in consumer products and stronger re-
search cooperation are important issues that the international community
must address and regulate.80
B. Stockholm Convention
The Stockholm Convention or POPs81 Convention was adopted in
2001. According to Article 1 of the Stockholm Convention, the Convention
deals with the protection of “human health and the environment from per-
sistent organic pollutants.”82 Pursuant to Article 3 of the Stockholm Con-
77. Id. art. 22(5)(b).
78. See supra Section I.A.
79. The conclusion that the scientific evidence regarding nanomaterials’ risks would
not be sufficient for a listing is supported by the practice of the Convention’s parties. For
example, Canada vetoed the listing of chrysotile asbestos despite clear scientific proof of its
severe health and environmental risks. For further information, see Kathleen Ruff, Quebec and
Canadian Governments End their Historic Support of the Asbestos Industry, 18 INT’L J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 263, 266 (2012).
80. For further details on important issues that the international community should
regulate with a new legal instrument, see infra Section III.B.
81. Persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”) are organic chemicals that remain intact in
the environment. They pose long-term hazards to human and animal health over a wide
regional or even global area. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 448-49.
82. Stockholm Convention, supra note 9, art. 1 (emphasis added).
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vention, the Convention prohibits the use or requires the elimination of the
production of certain chemicals listed in Annex A of the Stockholm Con-
vention.83 Furthermore, as set forth in Article 5 and Article 6 of the Stock-
holm Convention, the parties are required to prevent the release of listed
POPs from waste, stockpiles, or other sources.
Like the Rotterdam Convention, the parties to the Stockholm Conven-
tion can add new chemicals to the Convention’s scope with additional an-
nexes.84 Chemical experts assess proposals by the parties for new chemicals
and make a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties in accordance
with Article 8 of Stockholm Convention.85 As under the Rotterdam Con-
vention, the decision of the parties is ultimately a political one.86 However,
pursuant to Article 8(9) of the Stockholm Convention, parties shall decide
“in a precautionary manner,” which favors listing a potentially hazardous
chemical even when there is a level of uncertainty with respect to its poten-
tial hazardousness.87
Regarding the potential application of the Stockholm Convention to
nanomaterials, the Convention could deal with certain nanomaterials that
fall within the category of persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”). However,
many nanomaterials are inorganic, such as metals or carbontubes.88 There-
fore, a significant number of nanomaterials does not fall under the Stock-
holm Convention. Additionally, the Stockholm Convention, in any event,
only prohibits the use of some nanomaterials but does not deal with the
specific issues resulting from these new materials in general.89
83. Id. art. 3.
84. Id. arts. 5-6; PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
526 (3d ed. 2012); SUTTON, supra note 3, at 235; BROWN WEISS ET AL., supra note 72, at 711-12.
85. Stockholm Convention, supra note 9, art. 8.
86. Canada vetoing the listing of chrysotile asbestos under the Rotterdam Convention
perfectly illustrates the political character of the decision to list certain chemical substances.
Canada vetoed the listing of chrysotile asbestos primarily based on economic interests result-
ing from Quebec’s asbestos mines and asbestos industry. Cf.  Ruff, supra note 79, at 263;
supra Section II.A, note 79.
87. Stockholm Convention, supra note 9, art. 8(9); BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 450;
ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, CONSERVATION, BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW HORIZONS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY LAW 466-67 (2011); ELEN HEY, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73  (2016).
88. See also Simón-Vázquez et al., supra note 35, at 443.
89. There has been a similar problem with respect to the Rotterdam Convention, which
does not contain any nanospecific regulations. For more details on the Rotterdam Conven-
tion, see supra Section II.A.
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C. Basel Convention
The Basel Convention, adopted in 1989, deals with the transboundary
movements90 of hazardous wastes and their disposal. Under Article 3 of the
Basel Convention, wastes are qualified as hazardous if they are listed in the
annexes of the Convention or if parties of the Convention have declared
them as hazardous under their domestic law and informed the Convention’s
Secretariat about this declaration.91 According to Article 4 of the Basel
Convention, the main duties of the Convention are the requirement of prior
informed consent for transboundary movement of hazardous waste and an
environmentally sound management of such movements, such as exports or
imports of hazardous waste being moved in a manner that protects human
health and the environment.92
Applying the Basel Convention’s regulatory framework to nanomateri-
als, it is possible that certain nanomaterials can be listed in the Convention’s
annexes, or that parties to the Convention could declare them as hazardous
waste under domestic law. Even if parties to the Basel Convention do not
declare certain nanomaterials as hazardous waste, nanomaterials likely fall
under existing categories listed in the annexes of the Basel Convention. For
instance, according to Annex I, Y14 of the Basel Convention, “waste chemi-
cal substances . . . which are not identified and/or are new and whose effects
on man and/or the environment are not known” fall within the scope of the
Convention.93 Additionally, pursuant to Annex III, sections H5.1, H6.1, H8
and H12 of the Basel Convention, the Convention also applies to waste that
is “oxidizing,” “poisonous,” “corrosive,” or “(eco)toxic.”94 Consequently, the
Basel Convention can apply to nanomaterials if the nanomaterials fulfill
these requirements, which, in fact, many nanomaterials do.95 However, even
if nanomaterials fall within the scope of the Basel Convention, the Conven-
tion merely regulates the transboundary movement of waste consisting of
nanomaterials. Just as with the Rotterdam or Stockholm Convention, the
90. Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Basel Convention, the term “transboundary move-
ment” means any movement of wastes “from an area under the national jurisdiction of one
State to or through an area under the national jurisdiction of another State or to or through
an area not under the national jurisdiction of any State, provided at least two States are
involved in the movement.” Basel Convention, supra note 10, art. 2(3).
91. Id. art. 3
92. Id. art. 4; cf. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 72, at 956; SANDS ET AL., supra note 84, at 569.
93. Basel Convention, supra note 10, Annex I, sec. Y14.
94. Id. Annex III, secs. H5.1, H6.1, H8, H12.
95. For further details on the effects and toxicity of different substances at a nanoscale,
see Bahadar et al., supra note 34, at 2-5; see also supra Section I.A; supra Section I.B.1.
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Convention does not deal with the other, more general issues regarding
nanomaterials and their risks.96
III. THE NEED FOR DEVELOPING SPECIFIC REGULATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE RISKS OF NANOMATERIALS
Although the risks of nanomaterials constitute a global concern, most
nanomaterials fall outside the scope of existing international treaties regu-
lating hazardous substances. In any event, even where treaties apply, they
do not provide adequate solutions to regulate the specific risks of nano-
materials.97 Consequently, there is a need for specific regulations that effec-
tively respond to the challenges and risks that nanomaterials pose to the
environment. This section examines the possibility of developing such regu-
lations. First, this section presents organizations that could potentially take
responsibility for organizing and coordinating efforts to develop new regu-
lations. Second, this section provides an overview of possible general ap-
proaches that could be implemented in nanospecific regulations. Third, this
section explores whether the regulations should be legally binding or non-
binding.
A. Which Organizations Could Lead the Development of
Nanospecific Regulations?
Many countries have started selectively regulating some of the risks of
nanomaterials.98 Simultaneously, many international bodies have recog-
nized that nanomaterials impose certain risks to the environment and
human health. In 2008, the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety
(“IFCS”)—a brainstorming forum for chemical safety—discussed nano-
materials on a global level for the first time.99 Since then, countless interna-
tional bodies have initiated reports and set up committees to assess the risks
of nanomaterials. For instance, the Strategic Approach to International
96. See supra Section II.A; supra Section II.B.
97. See supra Section II.A; supra Section II.B; supra Section II.C.
98. See supra Section I.B.2. Apart from domestic legislation, countries often establish
intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms and scientific committees to assess possible risks
and issues of nanomaterials. For example, the U.S. has started the National Nanotechnology
Initiative, which aims to better understand nanotechnology and its risks. Similarly, the EU
has the SCENIHR—a scientific committee advising the European Commission on various
scientific issues, including nanomaterials. For more details, see infra Section III.B.2; NAT’L
SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 2; SCENIHR, supra note 5.
99. U.N. Inst. for Training & Research (UNITAR), Guidance for National Na-
notechnology Policy and Programme 9 (2011), [hereinafter UNITAR], http://www.unitar
.org/cwm/sites/unitar.org.cwm/files/UNITAR%20nano%20guidance_Pilot%20Edition%20
2011.pdf.
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Chemicals Management (“SAICM”)—a policy framework that fosters the
sound management of chemicals—is actively promoting research and inter-
national cooperation in the field of nanomaterials.100
Similarly, standardization bodies,101 such as the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (“ISO”) or the European Committee for Standardi-
zation (“CEN”), have issued several documents for the standardization and
classification of nanomaterials and nanotechnology. For example, ISO pub-
lished a system that helps to classify and categorize nanomaterials, which
should “prevent adverse health and safety consequences during the produc-
tion, handling, use, and disposal of manufactured nanomaterials.”102
Furthermore, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”), the World Health Organization (“WHO”), the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”), and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) have
all engaged in gathering information concerning nanomaterials.103 The
OECD, in particular, has taken a leading role in addressing potential chal-
lenges posed by nanomaterials to the environment. To address these chal-
lenges, the OECD has set up two bodies: the Working Party on
Manufactured Nanomaterials and the Working Party on Nanotechnology.
These two bodies assess the safety of manufactured nanomaterials, increase
research pertaining to nanomaterials and develop policy advice.104 Ulti-
mately, the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of
Chemicals (“IOMC”)—a program ensuring the coordination of any chemi-
100. See Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 31, at 22; UNITAR, supra note 99, at 10.
101. The term “standardization body” refers to any organization that develops and issues
documents pertaining to the technical standards of a certain process or material. The Ameri-
can National Standards Institute is another example of a standardization body in addition to
ISO or CEN. About ANSI, AM . NAT’L STANDARDS INST., https://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/over
view/overview?menuid=1 (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
102. For further details, see Int’l Org. for Standardization, Nanotechnologies: Health and
Safety Practices in Occupational Settings Relevant to Nanotechnologies, ISO/TR 12885 (2008),
https://www.iso.org/standard/52093.html?browse=tc; Int’l Org. for Standardization, Na-
notechnologies: Methodology for the Classification and Categorization of Nanomaterials, ISO/TR
11360 (2010), https://www.iso.org/standard/55967.html?browse=tc.
103. Nupur Chowdhury, Transnational Regulation of Nanotechnology: Institutional Diversity
in Agenda Setting and State Support, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: A MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACH 171, 171 (Michiel A. Heldeweg & Evisa Kica eds., 2011); Ludlow Karinne et
al., Conclusions: Big Regulatory Question—Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue?, in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 385,
399 (Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2007); UNITAR, supra note 99, at 10.
104. Although the OECD consists of primarily Western countries, it makes sure that
nations such as China, Russia, or Thailand and other organizations such as environmental
NGOs or labor groups can participate in its nanomaterial working groups. See OECD, Flyer
on Nanomaterials at OECD 1 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/science/nanosafety/45910212.pdf;
UNITAR, supra note 99, at 11.
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cal issues among international organizations—must help coordinate the
work of all the international bodies engaged in research and developments
in the field of nanotechnology.105
These examples represent only a small overview of the most important
work concerning nanomaterials on an international level. Nevertheless, this
overview gives insight into the multiple, complex, and certainly confusing
efforts of the international community in assessing nanomaterials and their
risks.
The international community apparently prefers to work with a rather
piecemeal approach than to coordinate its efforts. However, to establish an
international regulatory framework for nanomaterials, it is highly advisable
to combine all these efforts and to improve coordination between interna-
tional bodies. Ideally, one international body should take the lead in the
coordination of the development of nanospecific regulations.
However, it is unclear which international body would be appropriate
for that role. One may think of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (“UNEP”), especially since “[d]eveloping international . . .  envi-
ronmental agreements and legal instruments” and “[p]romoting
international cooperation” are two of UNEP’s official responsibilities.106
Unfortunately, UNEP has not engaged in any work regarding nanomateri-
als apart from some small publications.107 Nevertheless, if UNEP accepted a
more relevant role in the field of nanomaterials, it could prove its relevance
by regulating future dangers for the environment.
In contrast, the OECD has shown a much stronger involvement in de-
veloping nanospecific research and policy. However, the OECD, as an or-
ganization of mainly Western countries, may not be the ideal body to lead
the development of global nanospecific regulations.
In the end, the international community must decide together which
organization(s) should be in charge of developing a nanospecific interna-
tional regulatory framework because such a decision also has a strong politi-
cal component. Political considerations aside, a global environmental
organization like UNEP seems to be the optimal choice because the coordi-
nation and the development of an environmental regulatory framework is
part of UNEP’s core responsibilities. In any event, to benefit from existing
know-how and past regulatory efforts, the future leading organization in
developing a nanospecific framework can and should still work together
with other international bodies.
105. See UNITAR, supra note 99, at 10.
106. UNEP, Organization Profile, 18, 23 (2005), http://staging.unep.org/PDF/UNEP
OrganizationProfile.pdf.
107. UNEP 2007, supra note 7, at 62; UNEP 2017, supra note 15, at 24.
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B. What Would the Basic Regulatory Approaches Toward the
Risks of Nanomaterials Look Like?
The previous section has identified possible organizations that could
lead the development of nanospecific regulations. However, the question
remains which general rules or principles the international community
should implement when it develops a nanospecific treaty. It is beyond the
scope of this Note to provide detailed rules that could be implemented
through international cooperation. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide
general guidance and ideas on what the basic regulatory approaches toward
nanomaterials should look like. The following section takes a closer look at
three key elements that could help regulate the risks of nanomaterials: (1)
the precautionary principle, (2) a technology transfer and research coopera-
tion, and (3) a duty to promote transparency.
1. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle seeks to determine how to manage possible
risks for the environment, although there is scientific uncertainty with re-
spect to these risks.108 In general, the precautionary principle requires ap-
propriate action when there are reasonable grounds of a risk of serious harm
despite the existence of scientific uncertainty.109 According to Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration, “lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”110 In short, the precautionary principle reflects a “better safe
than sorry” approach toward possible environmental risks.111
As scientists have still not produced comprehensive and conclusive re-
search concerning the risks of nanomaterials,112 the precautionary principle
is predestined to be a key element in a treaty regulating nanomaterials.
Although there is some scientific uncertainty regarding the risks of nano-
108. BEYERLIN & MARAUHN, supra note 71, at 47; TANJA EHNERT, THE EU AND NA-
NOTECHNOLOGIES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 36 (2017); O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 533; Oud,
supra note 61, at 276; David L. VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Approach and the International
Control of Toxic Chemicals: Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
605, 607-08 (2011).
109. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 157; Laurance Boisson de Chazournes, New Technolo-
gies, The Precautionary Principle, and Public Participation, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 161, 163 (Thérèse Murphy ed., 2009); see Heselhaus, supra note 31, at 92 (saying that
there is a need to strike a balance between increasing wealth and reducing risk where uncer-
tainty exists); see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 72, at 480-81 (saying that the precautionary princi-
ple should only be used after determining the level of uncertainty); SARGENT, supra note 5, at
16.
110. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at 15.
111. SUTTON, supra note 3, at 240.
112. See supra Introduction; supra Section I.B.
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materials, the current scientific results provide reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that nanomaterials can cause serious environmental harm.113 Under the
precautionary principle, it would be necessary to ensure that the potential
risks of nanomaterials cannot materialize in reality.114 Therefore, countries
would need to take measures to protect the environment from potential
risks. For instance, it could be appropriate to restrict the widespread use of
certain nanomaterials in consumer goods, like cosmetics, if there is scientific
evidence suggesting that these nanomaterials could cause serious harm.
The Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides a starting point for
how the international community could formulate a norm to implement the
precautionary principle.115 However, there are more examples that could be
considered as a template for a future precautionary norm: for instance, Arti-
cle 8(9) of the Stockholm Convention has a weaker implementation of the
precautionary principle than Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. Arti-
cle 8(9) of the Stockholm Convention only requires that the Conference of
the Parties “shall decide, in a precautionary manner,” whether to list new
chemical substances in the Convention’s annexes.116
Another example is Article 11(8) of the Biosafety Protocol117, which
states that a “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scien-
tific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential ad-
verse effects of a living modified organism” shall not prevent a party from
making a decision on the import of the organism.118 The Rio Declaration,
the Stockholm Convention, and the Biosafety Protocol have an open ap-
proach toward the precautionary principle, which does not specify how to
address a potential risk. Comparatively, the Agenda 21119 has a more con-
crete approach toward the precautionary principle. For example, Arti-
113. For further details on the possible harm for the environment, see supra
Section I.B.1.
114. Cf. UNEP 2017, supra note 15, at 27, 31.
115. Cf. supra Section III.B.1.
116. Stockholm Convention, supra note 9, art. 8(9); cf. supra Section II.B.
117. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. The Biosafety Protocol is an in-
ternational convention that the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity initiated.
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Biosafety Protocol, this Convention should ensure the safe han-
dling, transport, and use of living modified organisms. The Biosafety Protocol provides dif-
ferent regulations with respect to the usage, transit, and risk assessment of living modified
organisms. See id. arts. 6, 11, 15-16, 20.
118. Id. art. 11(8).
119. The Agenda 21 is an international plan of actions that the UN introduced after the
Earth Summit in 1992. According to Article 1(3) and Article 2(1) of the Agenda 21, this plan
should establish and support sustainable development on a global level. The Agenda 21 pro-
vides measures in various fields such as the environment, science, workspaces, education, and
other social and economic areas. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
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cle 17(21) of the Agenda 21 lists possible “precautionary measures” to
protect the marine environment, including “environmental impact assess-
ments, clean production techniques, recycling, waste audits and minimiza-
tion . . . [and] quality management criteria for the proper handling of
hazardous substances.”120
Since the exact obligations under a general precautionary principle can
be highly debated,121 the international community should favor a more con-
crete approach for regulating nanomaterials.122 With an enumeration of spe-
cific measures to protect the environment, there will be more legal certainty
regarding the obligations that stem from the precautionary principle. Thus,
it will be easier to ensure that all the parties comply with their precaution-
ary obligations.
Although the precautionary principle is widely accepted among scholars
and in international practice, there are also skeptical voices. Some authors
suggest that the precautionary principle could hinder beneficial economic or
social developments because it restricts innovative technologies due to mere
scientific uncertainty.123 Although innovative technologies inherently pose
great opportunities for social welfare, the economy, and human health, they
may also impose new risks. The difficult task is the balancing of potential
risks and opportunities or—in the legal context—between the absence of
any regulations and overregulation of innovative technology.
As part of this balancing, one should resist approving new technologies
for the sake of technological progress. Instead, one must restrict and regu-
Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vols. I, II, III), (Aug. 12, 1992), https://sustainable
development.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.
120. Id. art. 17(2).
121. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 160-61; Floor M. Fleurke, Catastrophic Climate Change,
Precaution, and the Risk/Risk Dilemma, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 197, 205 (Mónika Ambrus et al. eds., 2017); O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 71, at
534; BÉNÉDICTE SAGE-FULLER, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIGH RISK VESSELS 119 (2013).
122. The exact formulation of a future norm should definitely be phrased in collabora-
tion with several nations, scientists, NGOs, and as many other stakeholders as possible.
Preferably, scientists could recommend precautionary measures that would help protect the
environment and therefore would have a scientifically adequate basis for implementation in a
treaty.
123. Fleurke, supra note 121, at 209; Mark E. Meaney, Lessons from the Sustainability
Movement: Toward An Integrative Decision-Making Framework for Nanotechnology, 34 J. L.,
MED. & ETHICS 682, 682 (2006); Søren Holm & John Harris, Precautionary Principle Stifles
Discovery, 400 NATURE 398, 398 (1990); Hailemichael Teshome Demissie, Taming Matter for
the Welfare of Humanity: Regulating Nanotechnology, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES,
REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 327, 342 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung
eds., 2008); cf. SUTTON, supra note 3, at 241, 342.
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late new technologies in accordance with scientific findings.124 In any case,
it is not the intent of the precautionary principle to have a “technology-
freezing” effect.125 Quite the contrary, the precautionary principle requires
technological progress and especially further scientific research to identify
and avoid potential risks of new technologies.126 Only with more detailed
and extensive scientific research can scientists evaluate potential risks of
nanomaterials and conduct a proper risk assessment as the precautionary
principle requires.127 Consequently, the precautionary principle supports
the improvement of new technologies and merely prevents the use of new
technologies that are detrimental to the environment. In other words, the
precautionary principle does not hinder new technologies. Rather, it estab-
lishes a more cautious balance between technological progress and environ-
mental safety where the environment enjoys the benefit of the doubt.
2. Technology Transfer and Research Cooperation
The current international efforts to advance the knowledge about nano-
materials do not constitute a well-organized international cooperative effort
but rather a fragmented approach involving single international bodies.128
To successfully implement global regulations for nanomaterials and their
risks, it is necessary to establish a general commitment toward research co-
operation and a technology transfer mechanism.129
If international bodies combined their efforts in scientific research,
policymaking, and risk assessment, it would advance the current state of
scientific knowledge concerning nanomaterials. Particularly, it could help to
comprehensively assess the potential risks nanomaterials have. Therefore, a
dialogue between the various nations, scientific bodies, NGOs, and other
stakeholders would allow the international community to address the envi-
124. Establishing restrictions and regulations based on scientific findings is not as easy
as it may seem. For example, there have been severe regulations for genetically modified
organisms (“GMOs”), though scientists have shown that GMOs are not as dangerous as
lawmakers and the public believe them to be. For further details on the regulatory approach
toward GMOs, see Gregory Conko et al., A Risk-Based Approach to the Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Organisms, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 493 (2016).
125. Holm & Harris, supra note 123, at 398.
126. Cf. DAVID A. DANA, Conditional Liability Relief as an Incentive for Precautionary Study,
in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 144, 145
(David A. Dana ed., 2012).
127. Cf. BRAZELL, supra note 11, at 106; see DANA, supra note 126, at 153.
128. See supra Section III.A.
129. The term “research cooperation and technology transfer mechanism” means the
institutionalized process of synergizing the national efforts and results in research and devel-
opment pertaining to nanomaterials. Details of such a technology transfer and research coop-
eration can vary immensely. Cf. supra Section III.B.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA206.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-MAY-18 13:45
470 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 7:2
ronmental risks of nanomaterials with well-informed judgment and broad
support.130
Moreover, developing countries could benefit from global research co-
operation and technology transfer. Continuing with the theme of global
collaboration, the international community could also provide financial sup-
port to developing countries, NGOs, or research projects. As a result, the
international community could avoid a knowledge or even regulation gap
between certain regions. As stated above, nanomaterials could potentially
cross long distances and even borders.131 Hence, as many countries as possi-
ble must be made aware and capable of responsible risk management for
nanomaterials. Otherwise, regional use of nanomaterials without due care
could lead to cross-border harm and consequently weaken all global efforts
to protect the environment from the risks of nanomaterials.
A successful international technology transfer and research cooperation
ought to incorporate three main instruments: (1) strong collaboration
among scientists around the globe, (2) financial support for international
research programs and for efforts toward regulation in developing countries,
and (3) a complete and in-depth exchange and discussion of new findings
pertaining to nanomaterials and their risks.
Existing programs that have already established a similar research and
technology transfer can serve as a guide to create well-functioning interna-
tional research cooperation as a part of an international treaty regulating
nanomaterials. For example, the EU has set up an independent, scientific
body: the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health
Risks (“SCENIHR”).132 The SCENIHR is composed of scientists who may
consult with other experts with specialized knowledge in a certain subject
matter.133 This group of scientific experts has the task of providing opin-
ions, reports, and advice on emerging and newly identified health risks to
the European Commission.134 Thus, the European Commission can rely on
scientific expertise to determine possible steps to be taken in regulating
health risks. Besides the technology and research transfer for the European
Commission, the SCENIHR’s work is also publicly available, and
SCENIHR can collaborate with other scientific bodies to establish a dia-
logue with as many stakeholders as possible.135
130. See Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 31, at 26-27; Marchant & Sylvester, supra note 63,
at 717; Türk & Liedtke, supra note 5, at 69.
131. See supra Section I.B.1.
132. Commission Decision 2008/721, art. 1(1)(c), 2008 O.J. (L 241) (EC).
133. Id. arts. 3-4
134. Id. arts. 1(1)(c), 2(1), 2(3).
135. Id. arts. 1(13-14), 2(5).
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Similarly, the U.S. has introduced the National Nanotechnology Initia-
tive, which establishes cooperation between several federal departments,
agencies, and commissions to increase knowledge and experience in dealing
with nanotechnology.136 The National Nanotechnology Initiative not only
establishes cooperation between several governmental agencies but also de-
velops a research program and fosters the transfer of scientific knowledge
regarding nanomaterials into nanospecific regulations.137 The National Na-
notechnology Initiative has used over USD 25 billion to advance multidis-
ciplinary and fundamental research concerning nanomaterials.138 Moreover,
this program has helped “to develop science-based regulations to protect
human health and the environment” and to start a broader discussion about
nanotechnology.139
Both the SCENIHR and the National Nanotechnology Initiative serve
as prime examples of how to form and establish an international technology
transfer and research cooperation. Thus, to establish international coopera-
tion, it makes sense to rely on the existing experience of the SCENIHR
and the National Nanotechnology Initiative when creating comparable pro-
grams or instruments on an international level.
3. A Duty to Promote Transparency
Although nanomaterials are frequently used in consumer goods,140
many consumers may have never heard of nanomaterials and their associ-
ated environmental risks. At the same time, the current generation is more
environmentally conscious than ever before.141
Why should one not take advantage of this fact? It seems likely that
broader awareness and transparency concerning nanomaterials and their
possible risks would encourage consumers to handle products with nano-
materials more cautiously. Better-informed consumers who are not willing
to bear the risks of nanomaterials could lead to a generally more careful and
136. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE: STRATEGIC PLAN iii
(2016), http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/2016-nni-strategic-plan.pdf.
137. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH.  COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 19; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 136, at 6, 10, 16, 22.
138. NAT’L SCI. & TECH.  COUNCIL, The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Supplement to the
President’s 2018 Budget 11 (2017), https://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/NNI-FY18-
Budget-Supplement.pdf; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 32.
139. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 32 (emphasis added).
140. See supra Section I.A.
141. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE GENERATION GAP AND THE 2012 ELECTION, ANGRY SILENTS,
DISENGAGED MILLENNIALS 95-99 (2011), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-3-11%
20Generations%20Release.pdf; Gwynne Rogers, The Rise of Generation Y in the Sustainable
Marketplace, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-busi
ness/blog/rise-generation-y-sustainable-marketplace.
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restricted use of nanomaterials.142 Additionally, greater awareness and cau-
tion among consumers could strengthen and reaffirm the precautionary ap-
proach toward nanomaterials.143 However, increasing consumer’s self-
responsibility requires increasing awareness and transparency regarding
nanomaterials.
Here, a duty to promote transparency could be crucial. If nations com-
mitted themselves at an international level to adopt rules that make their
population more aware of nanomaterials, such awareness could have a posi-
tive impact on the handling and use of nanomaterials.144 For example, the
international community could agree on an official label for goods contain-
ing nanomaterials. Such a “nano-label” would be comparable to other labels
that indicate, for example, whether a product is organic or contains geneti-
cally modified ingredients. As the EU has demonstrated with a duty to list
nanomaterials in the ingredients of certain consumer goods, a label for na-
nomaterials could be a feasible first step toward a more transparent use of
nanotechnology.145
Another step toward promoting transparency could be the implementa-
tion of a PIC-mechanism, similar to the PIC-procedure under the Rotter-
dam Convention.146 Under a PIC-procedure for products containing
nanomaterials, exporting nations would be required to inform importing
nations about the import of products that contain nanomaterials. Thereaf-
ter, the importing nation would have to consent to the planned imports.
142. For example, consumers’ increased environmental consciousness regarding organic
products and meat production has had positive effects on agriculture and animal farming. Cf.
Meredith Cohn & Tim Wheeler, USDA Takes Accounting of Organic Farms, CHI. TRIB., http://
www.chicagotribune.com/ifestyles/sns-green-certified-organic-farms-story.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018); BETTY S. KING ET AL., FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, CONSUMER TRENDS AND OPPORTU-
NITIES: AN OVERVIEW, 3-4 (2000), http://www2.ca.uky.edu/agcomm/pubs/ip/ip58a/ip58a.pdf.
Furthermore, a more transparent handling of nanomaterials would not only be favorable for
the environment but also more appropriate and fair for the consumer’s self-determination.
143. Cf. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 109, at 163-66 (stating the precautionary
principle requires increased transparency since precaution is symbiosis of technical, scien-
tific, social, political, and legal agents and actions).
144. Experience has shown that more conscious consumers can have an impact on envi-
ronmental issues. For instance, the growing awareness regarding the positive effects of or-
ganic products has tremendously increased organic and more sustainable agriculture. Cf.
Jonathan H. Adler, Labeling the Little Things, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 203, 208-15 (David A. Dana ed., 2012); Cohn &
Wheeler, supra note 142; King et al., supra note 142.
145. Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 31, at 27; Rodine-Hardy, supra note 1, at 100; SCHULZ,
supra note 11, at 106-07.
146. Dawson, supra note 12, at 147.  For further details on the Rotterdam Convention,
see supra Section II.A.
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This PIC-procedure should help to protect importing nations from hazard-
ous or dangerous substances.147
However, the initial concept of the PIC-procedure under the Rotter-
dam Convention is fundamentally different compared to a PIC-procedure
for products containing nanomaterials. Chemicals that fall under the Rot-
terdam Convention are generally used by industrial companies or agricul-
turists in developing countries.148 Moreover, since most of the chemicals
under the Convention are pesticides, there is one main purpose for using
them: to protect plants from pests.149
Comparatively, various companies manufacture or sell products that
contain nanomaterials, and there are countless purposes for the use of nano-
materials.150 Because of the various purposes and ways companies use nano-
materials, it would be difficult and costly to monitor and to ensure that
countries gave their PIC to all imports of products that contain nanomateri-
als. Furthermore, compared to the 50 chemicals on the PIC-list of the Rot-
terdam Convention, the pure number of products that contain
nanomaterials is extremely high.151 Thus, the vast and increasing use of na-
nomaterials would lead to an immense paper chase for all imports and ex-
ports of products containing nanomaterials. At the same time, even
nanomaterials that do not have any detrimental effects on the environment
or human health would require a complex PIC-procedure.152 As a result, the
PIC-regulations could be disproportionate to the potential danger for im-
porting countries.
To limit the time and effort exhausted by a general PIC-procedure for
products containing nanomaterials, the international community would
147. Dawson, supra note 12, at 147; cf. supra Section II.A.
148. Cf. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, art. 3; O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 71, at
573. It is noteworthy that, pursuant to Article 3(2)(h)(ii) of the Rotterdam Convention,
chemicals that end users buy for their personal use do not fall under the scope of the Con-
vention. There are two reasons why such imports do not fall under the Convention. First, a
PIC procedure for end consumer imports could be expensive and time-consuming since
there could be a substantial number of such imports. In addition, it would require signifi-
cantly more effort to monitor whether consumer imports contain chemicals that fall under
the Rotterdam Convention. Second, because of the small quantities of chemicals that are
intended for personal use, there is only a small risk of negative impacts on the environment
or health. As a result, the costs and efforts of a PIC procedure for end user imports would be
disproportionate in comparison with the benefits of such a procedure.
149. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, annex III (35 of the 50 listed chemicals are
pesticides); cf. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 573.
150. For more details on consumer products containing nanomaterials, see Section I.A.
151. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, Annex III (there are 50 chemicals listed in
Annex III); see supra Section II.A (there are countless substances at a nanoscale).
152. As highlighted before, nanomaterials also can have positive effects. See supra Sec-
tion I.A; supra Section I.B.1, note 48.
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have to agree on a list of certain nanomaterials that require a PIC. How-
ever, the international community can already do that under the existing
Rotterdam Convention.153 There would be no need for a separate PIC-pro-
cedure in a convention dealing with the risks of nanomaterials.154
In conclusion, a general PIC-procedure for products containing nano-
materials would establish a complex and costly bureaucratic mechanism that
is not necessarily justified for every nanomaterial. Furthermore, it is already
possible under the existing Rotterdam Convention to list nanomaterials for
a PIC-procedure.155 Consequently, it seems advisable to use the existing
mechanisms with respect to a possible PIC-procedure for certain
nanomaterials.
C. Should Nanospecific Regulations Have a Legally Binding or
Non-Binding Character?
For any international regulatory framework, there are two main pos-
sibilities with respect to its legal character. There is the classic approach of a
legally binding regulation, which is also called “hard law.” The legally bind-
ing character of hard law is based on the legal obligation to fulfill and or to
comply with a regulation.156 Non-compliance with hard law can result in
legal actions aimed at enforcing the breached regulation.157 Comparatively,
a law or regulation can also have a legally non-binding character, resulting
in a so-called “soft law.” Soft law is the opposite of hard law because there is
no legal obligation to comply with soft law regulations.158 Consequently, the
major advantage of hard law is its legally binding and coercive character.
Thus, one may, at first sight, question the usefulness of soft law.
153. See supra Section II.A.
154. For the new legal framework regarding nanomaterials and their risks, one may
think of introducing a PIC procedure for end user imports that do not fall under the existing
Rotterdam Convention. However, as demonstrated, monitoring all end user imports of
(products containing) nanomaterials seems neither feasible nor appropriate. See Rotterdam
Convention, supra note 8, art. 4.
155. See supra Section II.A.
156. JÜRGEN FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL “SOFT LAW:” THE FUNCTIONS AND
LIMITS OF NONBINDING INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND LAW 7-8
(2013); Jon Birger Skjærseth, Exploring the Consequences of Soft Law and Hard Law: Implement-
ing International Nutrient Commitments in Norwegian Agriculture, 10 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 1,
3 (2010); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Comple-
ments, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 713-14 (2010).
157. BEYERLIN & MARAUHN, supra note 71, at 290; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 36.
158. Rebecca Byrnes & Peter Lawrence, Can “Soft Law” Solve “Hard Problems?”: Justice,
Legal Form and the Durban-Mandated Climate Negotiations, 34 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 34, 36
(2015); HEY, supra note 87, at 6.
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However, legally non-binding regulations have many advantages that
binding regulations lack. First, it can be easier to reach a consensus on a
certain subject because parties generally have a lower inhibition threshold to
agree to non-binding regulations.159 This lower inhibition threshold can be
very helpful in initiating a common discourse over possible regulations.160
Second, soft laws are less costly and more flexible with respect to their
negotiation and implementation.161 Third, the coercive character of a law is
no guarantee that the affected individuals will comply with it. In fact, there
are many reasons why individuals comply with legally non-binding rules,
such as their socialization, their self-interests, their society’s moral concep-
tion, or a simple internal motivation.162 Thus, soft laws can help strengthen
social and behavioral norms in our society.
Because of the advantages of soft laws, there are countless examples of
legally non-binding regulations in environmental law.163 One of the best
examples of an environmental soft law is the voluntary PIC system estab-
lished in 1989. This voluntary PIC system was the precursor to the Rotter-
dam Convention.164 In fact, the voluntary PIC system led to international
discourse about the need for legally binding regulations for certain hazard-
ous chemicals and pesticides.165 Moreover, the voluntary PIC system has
had a substantial influence on the PIC procedure of today’s Rotterdam
Convention. The voluntary PIC system, with over 150 nations participating,
showed that a legally binding PIC procedure could be possible and feasi-
ble.166 Without the voluntary PIC system, it is highly unlikely that the
international community would have agreed on today’s Rotterdam Conven-
159. BEYERLIN & MARAUHN, supra note 71, at 47; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 35; Byrnes
& Lawrence, supra note 158, at 44.
160. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 156, at 720-21; cf. Timothy F. Malloy, Soft Law and
Nanotechnology, A Functional Perspective, 52 JURIMETRICS 347, 349 (2012).
161. Byrnes & Lawrence, supra note 158, at 718; Birger Skjærseth, supra note 156, at 4.
162. Birger Skjærseth, supra note 156, at 2; FRIEDRICH, supra note 156, at 245-49.
163. For instance, there are several legally non-binding UNEP and OECD guidelines as
well as non-binding codes and guidelines of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), the North Sea Conference Declarations, and most regulations issued by the treaty
bodies of the Convention on Biological Diversity. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 156, at 22-51.
164. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 573. For more details regarding the Rotterdam or
PIC Convention, see supra Section II.A.
165. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 8, art. 3.
166. Nancy S. Zahedi, Implementing the Rotterdam Convention: The Challenges of Trans-
forming Aspirational Goals into Effective Controls on Hazardous Pesticide Exports to Developing
Countries, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 709 (1999).
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tion.167 This example demonstrates that soft laws can have an immense im-
pact on hard law regulations and even initiate their development.168
Regarding a nanospecific legal framework, it would be ideal to agree on
a widely accepted and legally binding treaty. However, in reality, it can be
difficult to establish a legally binding framework for regulating a highly
complex issue such as nanomaterials. To establish international consensus
on the regulation of nanomaterials could be especially challenging because
many countries have different regulatory approaches toward the potential
risks of nanomaterials.169
Consequently, a soft law can be the first step in laying the groundwork
for a legally binding international framework for regulating nanomaterials
and their risks. With this groundwork, the international community would
have an established consensus as a basis for discussing and agreeing to de-
tails for a hard law framework. Additionally, legally non-binding regulations
for nanomaterials could strengthen general awareness of the risks of nano-
materials. As a result, stakeholders, such as state legislators, scientists, en-
trepreneurs, and product developers, could become more cautious about the
potential risks of nanomaterials and thus start handling them with due care.
CONCLUSION
This Note shows that there are many uncertainties pertaining to the
young scientific field of nanotechnology and the use of nanomaterials. Nev-
ertheless, it is apparent that nanotechnology and nanomaterials will have a
huge impact on our future, including on science, healthcare, the economy,
and our daily lives.170 Simultaneously, it is evident that certain nanomateri-
als will also carry a negative impact on our environment, including humans,
animals, plants, and the ecosystem in general.171 Because of the characteris-
tics of nanomaterials, their negative effects on the environment transcend
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local dimensions, which means that nanomaterials can cause cross-border
harm.172 Thus, the risks posed by nanomaterials to the environment rise to
the level of a global concern, which requires internationally coordinated ef-
forts to protect the environment.173
The lack of comprehensive research regarding the risks of nanomateri-
als makes it difficult to assess and prevent their potential environmental
harm. Therefore, the international community must increase research and
technological developments on the environmental risks of nanomaterials.
The international community cannot just wait until scientists can provide
conclusive scientific results.  Rather, it needs to establish a precautionary
approach toward nanotechnology and nanomaterials.
The precautionary principle is the ideal legal instrument to deal with
the scientific uncertainty of the potential risks of nanomaterials. Applying
the precautionary principle to nanomaterials will enable the international
community to take protective measures without waiting until the potential
environmental risks of nanomaterials become reality.174 Furthermore, the
precautionary principle goes hand-in-hand with two other proposed regula-
tory approaches: research cooperation and a duty to promote
transparency.175
Only with advanced scientific knowledge and a broader awareness
among the general population will it be possible to determine and promote
adequate measures to protect the environment from nanomaterials. Ideally,
these measures should have a legally binding character. However, a soft law
that regulates nanomaterials can be a promising start to initiate a legally
binding international framework dealing with the environmental risks of
nanomaterials.176
To guarantee well-organized and coordinated protection of the environ-
ment, international institutions must take the lead in developing the instru-
ments and principles that could regulate nanomaterials and their risks. The
OECD’s current strong commitment toward regulating nanomaterials
seems to be an ideal basis on which the international community could
build. However, it is advisable to establish broader international support for
regulation of nanomaterials because the OECD is an organization with pri-
marily Western member states.177 Thus, a joint effort of the OECD and
another international environmental organization, like UNEP, would be
ideal for developing an international regulatory framework. This joint effort
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could pave the way for uniting and unifying the approaches of single na-
tions into an international effort to regulate nanomaterials and their risks.
To conclude, future regulations of nanomaterials are highly dependent
on successful international cooperation. The international community
should not only keep in mind the importance of protecting the environment
from the negative impacts of nanomaterials but should also think of future
regulations for other new technologies. Since the risks of new technologies
will be one of the main environmental challenges in the future, the interna-
tional community must demonstrate its ability to successfully deal with the
challenges stemming from such new technologies. Hence, effective interna-
tional regulations for the risks of nanomaterials will be a key step toward a
new era in environmental law.
